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WHAT WE DON'T SEE WHEN WE SEE COPYRIGHT AS 
PROPERTY 
JESSICA LITMAN* 
ABSTRACT. For all of the rhetoric about the central place of authors in the 
copyright scheme, our copyright laws in fact give them little power and less 
money. Intermediaries own the copyrights, and are able to structure 
licenses so as to maximise their own revenue while shrinking their pay-outs 
to authors. Copyright scholars have tended to treat this point superficially, 
because - as lawyers - we take for granted that copyrights are property; 
property rights are ji-eely alienable; and the grantee of a property right 
stands in the shoes of the original holder. I compare the 1710 Statute of 
Anne, ·which created statut01y copyrights and consolidated them in the 
hands of publishers and printers, with the 1887 Dawes Act, which served 
a crucial fimction in the American divestment of Indian land. I draw 
from the stories of the two laws the same moral: Constituting something 
as a freely alienable property right will almost always lead to results mir-
roring or exacerbating disparities in wealth and bargaining power. T11e 
legal dogma surrounding property rights makes it easy for us not to notice. 
KEYWORDS: Copyright, Property, Authors' Rights, alienability, DawesAct. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If you follow copyright law, it can't have escaped your attention that, in the 
US, the community of copyright law scholars has been deeply polaiised 
for the past 25 years. Some of us see ourselves as advocates for the 
* John F. Nickoll Professor of Law and Professor of Information, University of Michigan. Address for 
Correspondence: University of Michigan Law School, 625 S. State St., Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA. 
Email: jdlitman@mnich.edu. This essay is adapted from the 13th Annual University of Cambridge 
Centre for Intellectual Property and Information Law Intemational Intellectual Property Lecture, deliv-
ered at Emmanuel.College on 13 March 2018. I'm grateful to Jon Weinberg, Rebecca Giblin, Lionel 
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and her continuing encouragement and support was immensely helpful in my career as a legal scholar. 
Judge Fletcher died in 2012 at the age of 89 - an active senior judge who was still carrying a full case 
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undervalued interests of readers and other users; others argue that we need 
to increase the copyright protection we give to authors. It's gotten a little 
ugly. 1 We've called one another bad names.2 Advocates for copyright own-
ers have described scholars who defend the rights of users as hired guns 
paid by Google to write papers advancing its business interests.3 Some 
of us have stopped reading the work of scholars perceived to be on the . 
other side. 4 
I believe (or at least I hope) that that whole sorry era is almost over, or 
will be over as soon as we forgive one another· for all the nasty name-
calling. As concrete refonn proposals have emerged from the muck, it 
has become apparent that what was billed as a conflict between authors 
and users was never about that at all. Instead, what's been going on is a 
fight to the death among intennediaiies. The highly publicised record 
label lawsuits against individual users of peer-to-peer file-sharing applica-
tions5 tum out to have been a feint in a fight to hold Internet service pro-
viders liable for the activity of their subscribers.6 Bitter complaints about 
online consumer piracy7 were largely a prelude to efforts by major 
1 See e.g. T. Reilly, "Copyright and a Synergistic Society" (2017) I 8 Minnesota Journal of Law, Science 
& Technology 575, at 591-609 (analysing scholarship arguing for limits on copyright and attributing 
the authors' views to "copyright envy"). 
2 See e.g. H. Hansen, D.O. Carson, E. Moglen, W. Seltzer and C. Sims, "Mickey Mice? Potential 
Ramifications of Eldred v. Ashcroft" (2003) 13 Fordham Intell.Prop.Media & Ent.L.J 771, at 787 
("the anti-copyright professors"); H. Hqrbaczewski, "No Silver Lining for the Emperor's New 
Clothes: Golan and the Traditional Contours of Copyright" (2012) 59 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 
865, at 865 ("scholars that viewed the copyright law as a constitutional abomination"); I.F. 
Koenigsberg, "The Fifth Annual Christopher Meyer Memorial Lecture: Humpty Dumpty in 
Copyright Land" (2004) 51 J. Copyright So~'y U.S.A. 677, at 680 ("enemies of copyright"); M.A. 
Lemley, "Faith-Based Intellectual Property" (2015) 62 UCLA Law Review 1328, at 1343 ("the IP faith-
ful"); Reilly, "Copyright and a Synergistic Society", p. 625 ("anti-author proponents"); ibid., at p. 626 
("if one reads professorial accounts suc11 as these closely, one can also detect the perfidious underlying 
presence of 'copyright envy"'); P. Samuelso·n, "The Copyright Grab", WIRED, I Janumy 1996, avail-
able at <https://www.wired.com/1996/0l/white-paper/> ("copyright maximalists"); P. Schwartz and W. 
M. Treanor, "Essay, Eldred and Lochner: Copyright Term Extension and Intellectual Property as 
Constitutional Property" (2003) 112 Yale L.J. 2331, at 2331 ("the IP Restrictors"). Cf. K. McLeod, 
Freedom of Expression (New York 2005), 65 (referring to copyright bullies as "overzealous copyright 
bozos"). 
3 See B. Mullins and J. Nickas, "Inside Google's Academic Influence Campaign", Wall Street Journal, 
14 July 2017, available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/paying-professors-inside-googles-a:cademic-
influence-cmnpaign-1499785286>; A. Rogers, "Google's Academic Influence Campaign: It's 
Complicated", WIRED, 14 July 2017, available at <https://www.wired.com/story/googles-academic-
influence-campaign-its-complicated/>. 
4 See J. Litman, "War & Peace: The 34th Annual Donald C Brace Lecture" (2006) 53 J. Copyright Soc'y 
U.S.A. l; J. Litman, "The Politics of Intellectual Property" (2009) 27 Cardozo Arts & Ent.L.J. 313. 
5 See e.g. Capitol Records v Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (81h Cir. 2012); Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment v Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487 .(1st Cir. 2011). 
6 E.g. BMG Rights Management v Cox Communications, 881F.3d293 (41h Cir. 2018); EM! Christian 
Music v MP3Tunes, 844 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2016). See C. Doctorow, Information Doesn't Want to Be 
Free: Laws for the Internet Age (San Francisco 2014), 80-89. 
7 See e.g. Privacy and Piracy: The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and the 
Impact of Technology on the Entertainment Industry, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Affairs, 108th Congress (30 September 
2003), 19-20 (testimony of L.L. Cool, recording artist); Promoting Investment and Protecting 
Commerce Online: Legitimate Sites v. Para-sites, Hearing Before the Subcommittee On Intellectual 
Property of the House Judiciary Committee, I 12th Congress (14 March 2011 ), 61-62 (testimony of 
Frederick Huntsbeny, Paramount Pictures). 
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copyiight owners to narrow the safe harbours for online services. 8 Legacy 
intennediaiies (by which I mean publishers, record labels, and movie stu-
dios) are fighting with new-fangled inte1mediaries (that is, online service 
providers, platforms, and digital delivery businesses); what they are really 
fighting about is who gets to eat the biggest piece of pie.9 
Copyiight scholars can safely leave them to work it out without our help. 
If the core question in that dispute is whether the law ought to favour pub-
lishers over platfon11S or vice versa, the answer is unlikely to significantly 
change the copyright ecosystem. Neither side has much of a claim to the 
moral high ground. 10 The players on both sides are large, well-financed 
businesses with lots of lawyers in harness, so they don't pa1ticularly 
need the assi.stance of legal scholarship. That debate is less compelling 
from a theoretical or policy perspective than many other problems the copy-
1ight system faces. ·If the distiibution of goodies among old-fangled and 
new-fangled interrn:ediaries won't have much impact on decisions sur-
rounding the balance the law should stiike among writers and readers, 
many scholars will lose interest in this particular conflict. So, after we 
get our feet extracted from all the mud we've thrown at each other, I expect 
that the community of copyiight scholars will move on to more inti·iguing 
issues. 
In this essay, I hope to do two things. First, I'd like to focus attention on 
an important issue that should have been centi·al to our p1ior debates, but 
somehow wasn't: For all of the rhet01ic about the central place of authors 
in the copyiight scheme, our copyright laws in fact give them little power 
and less money. If a legal regime purpo1tedly designed for the benefit of 
authors systematically sh01i-changes them, why does that happen and 
what options might we have to respond? Copyiight scholars mention this 
problem often, 11 but have only rarely given it sustained attention. 
8 See e.g. United States Copyright Office: Section 512 Public Roundtable, 2 May 2016, available at 
<https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/public-roundtable/transcript_05-02-2016.pdf>. 
9 See e.g. R. Levine, Free Ride: How the Internet is Destroying the Culture Business and How the 
Culture Business Can Fight Back (London 2011); J. Taplin, Move Fast and Break Things: How 
Facebook, Google, and Amazon Cornered Culture and Undenuined Democracy (New York 2017); 
G. Pessach, "Deconstructing Disintermediation: A Skeptical Copy1ight Perspective" (2013) 31 
Cardozo Arts & Ent.L.J. 833; M. Rasenberger and C. Pepe, "Copyright Enforcement and Online File 
Hosting Services: Have Courts Struck the Proper Balance" (2012) 59 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 
627. Compare S.E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the US Economy: 2016 Report (December 2016), 
available at <http://www.iipawebsite.com/pdf/2016CpyrtRptFull.PDF>, with Computer and 
Communications Industry Association; Fair Use Industries in the U.S. Economy: Economic 
Contributions of Industries Relying on Fair Use (2017), available at <http://www.ccianet.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2017/06/Fair-Use-in-the-U.S.-Ecouomy-2017 .pdf>; US Copyright Office, Section 512 
Study (2017), available at <https://www.copyright.gov/policylsection512/> (public comments and tran-
scripts of public roundtables). 
10 See J.C. Ginsburg, "The Place of the Author in Copyright" in R.L. Okediji (ed.), Copyright Law in an 
Age of Exceptions and Limitations (New York 2017), 60, 66-68. 
11 See e.g. W. Patry, Moral Panics and the Copyright Wars (Oxford 2009), 117-19; D. Gervais, "User-
Generated Content and Music File-Sharing: A Look at Some of the More Interesting Aspects of Bill 
C-32" in M. Geist (ed.), From "Radical Extremism" to "Balanced Copyright": Canadian Copyright 
And The Digital Agenda (Toronto 2010 ), 447, 450; R. Giblin, "Reimagining Copyright's Duration" 
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Second, I'll try to offer an answer to the question why we've devoted so lit-
tle ink to the palt1y nature of authors' real-world copy1ight benefits. This 
issue, after all, is deeply impmtant on both a practical and theoretical 
level, so why don't we write about it more? At least part of the answer, 
I'll suggest, lies in the ways that we, as lawyers, think about prope1ty lights. 
II. DISEMPOWERED AUTHORS 
Let me acknowledge my priors. Twenty-first-century copyright law is a 
complex system with a bunch of interlocking and sometimes inconsistent 
purposes, but I believe that the most impmtant of those purposes are 
these: first, copylight law should encourage authors to create and widely 
disseminate works of authorship; second, it should give them meaningful 
opportunities to earn money from doing so; and, third, copyright law should 
encourage readers, listeners, viewers, and other users to encounter, enjoy 
and learn from those works of authorship. 12 There are other purposes, 
but they're subsidimy. To hijack a turn of phrase, populalised by 
Amazon.corn's vice president Russ Grandinelii, the only essential players 
in the copyright system are the author and the audience. 13 
Of course, the copylight system needs intennedimies to convey the 
works of authorship to their audiences and to channel the revenues 
flowing from the enjoyment of those works back to authors, but we can, 
and I think should, be agnostic as to whether the law should favour any 
of the competing intennedia1ies over the others. The most important con-
sideration is how well they accomplish their tasks of disseminating works 
to audiences and paying money to authors. 14 
So, let's look at how they're doing at those tasks. How well is the cmrent 
global copyright system working out for authors and for readers? I've spent 
much of my career arguing that the copyright interests of readers and other 
consumers are receiving too liiile aliention. 15 The problems the copylight 
in R. Giblin and K. Weatherall (eds.), What If We Could Reimagine Copyright? (2017) 177, 193-96; 
Ginsburg, "The Place of the Author in Copyright"; P.B. Hugenholtz, "The Great Copyright Robbery: 
Rights Allocation in a Digital Enviromnent" (2000), available at <htlps://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/down-
load/thegreatcopyrightrobbery.pdf'>; M. Van Houweling, "Authors vs Owners" (2016) 54 Hons.LR. 
371; M. Van Houweling, "Distributive Values in Copyright" (2004) 83 Tex.L.Rev. 1535. 
12 J. Litman, "Real Copyright Refonn" (2010) 96 Iowa L.Rev. I. See also e.g. Doctorow, Information 
Doesn't Want to Be Free, pp. 153-54. 
13 See D. Streatfield, "Amazon Signs Up Authors, Writing Publishers Out of.Deal", New York Times, 17 
October 2011, p. Al (quoting Grandinetti as having said: "The only really necessary people in the pub-
lishing process now are the writer and reader"). 
14 Many inte1mediaries, whether they are book publishers, online marketplaces or social media platforms, 
reasonably view their efforts at market analysis, strategy and design to involve great creativity. 
Comparable creativity is, of course, often required to sell products, like wheelbarrows or hot sauce, 
that are not works of authorship. The fact that intermediaries make creative and valuable contributions 
to the copyright ecosystem doesn't, without more, make them its indispensable beneficiaries. 
15 See e.g. J. Litman, "Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why we Can't 'Just Say Yes' to Licensing)" (1997) 
29 N.Y.U. Jomnal oflnternational Law & Policy 237; J. Litman, "The Exclusive Right to Read" (1994) 
13 Cardozo Arts & Ent.L.J. 29; J. Litman, "Lawfol Personal Use" (2007) 85 Tex.L.Rev: 1871. 
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law poses for readers haven't evaporated. For one thing, at least in the US, 
readers are paying for access to the works they encounter by giving up mas-
sive chunks of personal privacy. 16 US policymakers are beginning to appre-
ciate the risks of that approach, but it may already be too late to mend them. 
For another, many copyright owners have succeeded, at least so far, in their 
efforts to nullify the legal rights that the copyright law gives to users, by 
purporting to bind consumers to oveneaching end user license agree-
ments.17 I'm concerned that that will end up severely undermining the 
copyright system in the long term. Still, even with those problems, to the 
extent that one goal of copyright is to give members of the public many 
opportunities to enjoy a large variety of different works, in different formats 
and at different price points, the cmrent system is fabulously successful. 
The situation for authors, on the other hand, is more depressing. The 
copyright system, in tmth, has never been very good at either giving 
authors their choice of myriad channels for distributing their works to the 
public, or enabling them to earn meaningful amounts of money from 
doing so.18 If an author's goals are to communicate her works to their 
best audience and to earn an income from doing so, her choices end up 
being narrowly limited. Even if she succeeds in disseminating her work 
through the most suitable channel, she needs to accept that the intermediary 
who operates that cham1el will likely both control the distribution of her 
works and keep most of the money those works eam. 19 
In the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this bargain prob-
ably seemed pretty reasonable. Paper was expensive.20 Mass distribution 
required paper, along with printing presses, bookstores, warehouses, trucks, 
movie cameras and movie theatres, broadcast towers and communications 
satellites - required, in other words, a significant capital investment.21 It 
made sense in that context to expect that as the revenues from works of 
authorship flowed from users to authors, most of the money would be 
diverted along the way to pay for expensive reproduction and distribution 
solutions. 
16 See e.g. J.M. Newman, "The Myth of Free" (2018) 86 G.W. Law Rev. 513, at 551-55; G.A. Fowler, 
"Your Data Is Way More Exposed than You Think", Wall Street Journal, 24 May 2017, available at 
<https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-data-is-way-more-exposed-than-you-realize-1495657390>; 
S. Schechner and N. Kostove, "Google and Facebook Likely to Benefit from Europe's Privacy 
Crackdown", Wall Street Journal, 23 April 2017, available at <https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-eur-
opes-new-privacy-rules-favor-google-and-facebook-1524536324>. 
17 See A. Perzanowski and J. Schultz, The End of Ownership (Can1bridge, MA 2016), 15-101; M.J. 
Radin, Boile1p/ate (Prioceton 2013), 33-51, 168-76; see e.g. L. Hyde, Common as Air: Revolution, 
Art, and Ownership (New York 2010), 66-68. 
18 See e.g. Doctorow, Information Doesn't Want to Be Free, pp. xxii~xxv. 
19 See Litman, "Real Copyright Refonn", pp. 8-12. 
20 See M.A. Carroll, "Whose Music Is it Anyway? How We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form 
of Property" (2004) 72 U.Cin.L.Rev. 1405, at 1471. 
21 See e.g. J. Litman, "Sharing and Stealing" (2004) 26 Hastings Communication & Entertainment Law 
Journal 1, at 2. 
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In the twenty-first centmy, that explanation doesn't seem so reasonable. 
At least some popular reproduction and distribution alternatives are much 
less expensive than the older sorts.22 Digital reproduction, digital down-
loads and online streaming can be downright cheap - the fact that anyone 
can afford to do it is said to be a primary driver of increasing consumer pir-
acy.23 By all accounts, moreover, the money att1ibutable to the distribution 
and enjoyment ofworks of authorship is at an all-time high.24 Yet creators 
repmt that they are being paid much less than they used to be paid.25 
Some of the explanation for that might relate to the winner-take-all struc-
ture of many of the copyright intensive industiies. J.K. Rowling,26 Damien 
Hirst,27 Beyonce Knowles,28 George Lucas29 and Lin Manual Miranda30 
have earned a bunch of money from their works of authorship. The majority 
of creators, in contrast, regularly face the choice ofliving perilously close to 
22 See e.g. Hyde, Common as Air, pp. 64-65; M.A. Lemley, "IP in a World Without Scarcity" (2015) 90 
N.Y.U.L.Rev. 460, at 482-94. 
23 See e.g. 0. Kerr, "A Lukewarm Defense of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act" in A. Thierer and C. 
W. Crews (eds.), CopyFights: The Future of Intellectual Property in the Information Age (Washington 
2002), 163, 165-67; F. Von Lohmann, "Measuring the Digital Millennium Copyright Act Against the 
Darknet: Implications for the Regulation of Technological Protection Measures" (2004) 24 Loy.L.A. 
Ent.L.Rev. 635, at 638-43. · 
24 See e.g. J.P. Friedlander, "RIAA Year-End Music Jndustty Revenue Report", 22 March 2018, available 
at <http:/ /www.riaa.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/RIAA-Y ear-End-2017-N ews-and-N otes.pdf.>; 
Siwek, "Copyright Industries in the US Economy"; A. Szamosszegi and M.A. McCleary, "Fair Use 
in the US Economy" (2017), available at <https://www.ccianet.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Fair-
Use-in-the-U.S.-Economy-2017.pdf.>. Repmts focusing on particular income streams earned by some 
legacy intennediaries don't count all of the revenue that new-fangled intermediaries are collecting as 
a result of the online dissemination of works of authorship. See e.g. Statista, "Dossier: Film Indushy 
in the U.S." (2018), available at <https://www.statista.com/study/11472/film-industry-in-the-rmited-
states-statista-dossier/>. That money is of course pmt of the total that should be available for author 
compensation. Moreover, those indushy sector-specific repmts indicate that legacy intermediaries are 
earning impressive profits, despite the large mnounts of money paid to platforms and other new-fangled 
intennediaries. See e.g. ibid.; Friedlander, "RIAA Year-End Music Jndushy Revenue Report", p. 1. 
25 See e.g. K. Cowdray, "ALCS Survey Finds 15% Drop in Average Author Earnings since 2013", The 
Bookseller, 27 June 2018, available at <https://www.thebookseller.com/news/alcs-reveals-average-
author-eamings-even-lower-four-years-ago-81889 l>; D. Dupont, "Composer Maria Schneider Warns 
Students about the Future of the Music Industry", Bowling Green Independent News, 31 March 
2018, available at <http://bgindependentmedia.org/composer-maria-schneider-wams-students-about-
the-futqre-of-the-music-industry/>; M. Harris, "How Much Is a Word Worth?", Medium, 16 Apdl 
2018, available at <https://medium.com/s/story/how-much-is-a-word-worth-7fcdl3 la341c>; 
D. Preston, "Why Is it So Goddanmed Hard to Make a Living as a Writer Today?", Authors 
Guild Bulletin 63, Summer 2017. 
26 See J.B. Stewart, "In the Chamber of Secrets: J.K. Rowling's Net Worth", New York Times, 24 
November 2016, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ll/24/business/in-the-chamber-of-
secrets-jk-rowlings-net-worth.html>. 
27 See E. Kinsella, "Damien Hirst and Anish Kapoor Land on UK Rich List (Again)'', Artnet News, 8 May 
2017' available at <https://news.mtnet.com/art-world/artists-on-sunday-times-rich-list-9 5205 5>. 
28 See Z. O'Malley Greenburg, "The World's Highest Paid Women in Music 2017", Forbes, 20 November 
2017, available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2017/l l/20/the-worlds-hlgh-
est-paid-women-in-music-2017 />. 
29 See Z. O'Malley Greenburg, "America's Wealthiest Celebrities: The Top 10 by Net Worth", Forbes, 18 
December 2017, available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2017/12/18/ameri-
cas-wealthiest-celebrities-2017-the-top-ten-by-net-worth/>. 
30 See M. Paulson and D. Gelles, "Hamilton, Inc.: The Path to a Billion-Dollar Broadway Show", 8 June 
2016, available at <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/12/theater/hamilton-inc-the-path-to-a-billion-
dollar-show.html>. 
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the poverty line or working at a day job to suppmt their families. 31 But that 
isn't a new thing.32 If creators are earning even less than they used to, there 
are other factors at work. 
This is a complicated problem with multiple causes, but one of the causes 
is that many of the intennediaries in our story have recently figured out 
ways to earn more but pay authors less. I alluded earlier to the conflict 
between old-fangled and new-fangled intermediaries. The legacy intennedi-
aries seem to be incensed that setvice providers and platforms are collecting 
a large share of the revenues eained by copyrighted works. They've 
invented a catch phrase, the "value gap", to describe their complaint, 
which is that the new-fangled intetrnediaries have too much bargaining 
power and are able to use that bargaining power to 11egotiate lower license 
fees than the legacy intermediaries believe that they should pay.33 
Publishers, record labels, and motion picture studios argue that lawmakers 
should change the law to tilt the playing field in their favour, so that they 
can bargain for higher fees. 34 Meanwhile, though, they are making up for 
what they believe are pitifully inadequate licensing fees by structuring the 
licensing deals to minimise their own obligation to pay royalties to crea-
tors. 35 If Spotify or YouTube pays copyright owners for the use of 
music, for example, by giving music publishers and record labels an equity 
stake in the company, or by paying an annual up-front blanket license fee, 
ncine of that money needs to be passed on to composers or musicians.36 
31 See e.g. T. London and B. Pesner, Outrageous Fortune: The Life and Times of the New American Play 
(New York 2009), 50-96; R. )Jeahl, "New Guild Survey Reveals Majority of Authors Earn Below 
Poverty Line'', Publishers Weekly, 11 September 2015, available at <https://www.publishersweekly. 
com/pw/by-topic/induslry-news/publisher-news/article/68008-new-guild-survey-reveals-majority-of-
authors-eam-below-poverty"line.html>; J. Gibson, P. Johnson and G. Dimita, "The Business of Being an 
Author: A Survey of Authors' Earnings and Contracts", April 2015, available at <https://orca.cfac.uk/ 
72431/l/Final%20Report%20-%20Fot%20Web%20Publication.pdf>; M. Kretschmer, "Does Copyright 
Law Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Creators Earnings", 21 May 2012, available at SSRN: <https:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=2063735>; M. Kretschmer, S. Singh, L. Bently and E. Cooper, "2011 Copyright 
Contracts and Earnings of Visual Creators: A Survey of 5800 British Designers, Fine Artists, 
Illustrators and Photographers", 2011, available at <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf74899875.pdf>. 
32 See e.g. H. Finklestein, "The Copyright Law: A Reappraisal" (1956) 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1025, at 1051; 
M. O'Rourke, "Bargaining in the Shadow of Copyright Law After Tasifn"' (2003) 53 Case W.Res.L. 
Rev. 605, at 613-14. 
33 See G. Peoples, "War of Words: Labels and Trade Groups Target YouTube's 'Value Gap"', Billboard, 
13 April 2016, available at <hltps://www.billboard.com/articles/business/7333110/war-of-words-labels-
trade-groups-youtube-value-gap>; see e.g. Joint Comments of the American Association oflndependent 
Music et. al., In re: Section 512 Study, 31 March 2016, available at <https://www.riaa.com/wp-contentl 
uploads/2016/03/Music-Community-Submission-in-re-DMCA-512-FIN AL-755944 5 .pdf>; International 
Federation of the Phonographic Indushy, "Europe's Creators, Cultural and Creative Jndush·ies' Call 
to the European Council: Secure the Aims of the Proposed Copyright Directive in the DSM", 12 
April 2018, available at <http://wWw.ifpi.org/downloads/EU_Creators_Cultural_and_Creative_ 
Industries_Call_to_European_Council.pdf>. 
34 See e.g. IFPI, "Rewarding Creativity: Fixing the Value Gap", available at <http://www.ifj:>i.org/value_-
gap.php> (visited 19 April 2018). 
35 See e.g. K. Garcia, "Private Copyright Ref mm" (2013) 20 Mich. Telecom. & Technology Law Review 
I, at 22-23, 27-29. . 
36 See e.g. 19 Recordings v Sony Music Entertainlilent, No. 14-CV-1056 (SDNY filed 24 June 2015); 
Z. O'Malley Greenburg, "Revenge of the Record Labels: How the Majors Renewed Their Grip on 
Music", Forbes, 15 April 2015, available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/ 
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In a similar vein, publishers have reinterpreted extant contracts and 
redrafted new contracts to reduce the royalty rates for digital distribution 
of the works they control. In standard 20th century book and music publish-
ing and recording contracts, authors were paid a small percentage of rev-
enue for the manufacture and distribution of hard copies and a larger 
share of the income from licensing the work to another business. 37 That 
made sense; the smaller royalty for hard copies reflected the expense of 
manufacturing and distributing the copies, neither of which were implicated 
by licensing deals. When publishers and record labels licensed works to 
music and eBook dist1ibution services to enable the services to make the 
works available for paid digital downloads, though, they insisted that 
they need only pay the lower royalty rate designated for the sale of hard 
copies, and that's the rate that they paid.38 
On one level, none of this should surprise us. Of course, the people who 
conu·ol the tenns and conditions of use will structure those terms and con-
ditions in ways that best advance their own interests. What I find notable is 
how little attention these recent moves have attracted from legal scholars. 
Indeed, even though we are all likely aware of these developments (because 
we live in the world), if you read most of what American copyiight scholars 
have written about copy1ight revision, you'd conclude we don't think that 
these developments should wony us as much as other problems. 39 
2015/04/15/revenge-of-the-record-labels-how-the-majors-renewed-their-grip-on-music>. In 2016, 
major record labels in the US announced that musicians would eventually be paid a share of the 
profits that the labels earned from selling their equity stakes in Spotify, but have been slow to disclose 
specifics. Z. O'Malley Greenburg, "Spolify Goes Public at $30 Billion: When Will Artists See Any of 
That?", Forbes, 3 April 2018, available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2018/ 
04/03/spotify-ipo-goes-public-at-30-billion-when-will-artists-see-any-of-that>. Sony Music 
Entertainment sold half of its equity stake in Spotify in April of 2018, earning an estimated $761 mil-
lion. In June of2018, the company promised that it would pass along a pmtion of the proceeds from the 
sale to artists and independent labels beginning in August. See M. Newman, "Sony Music 
Entertainment to Start Paying Indie Artists and Labels Spotify Sale Proceeds as Early as August", 
Billboard, 14 June 2018, available at <https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/8461117/sony-
music-canada-spotify-pay-indie-artists-labels>. Warner Music sold 75% of its stake in Spotify in 
May of 2018, but, as of this writing, has not revealed its plans for sharing the money with creators. 
37 See e.g. R. Curtis, How to Be Your Own Litermy Agellt: An Insider's Guide to Gettillg Your Book 
Published (New York 2003), 62-76, 295-97; N. Aragon, "Note: Calculating Artists' Royalties: An 
Analysis of the Courts' Dualistic Interpretations of Recording Contracts Negotiated in a Pre-Digital 
Age" (2017) 2017 Cardozo Law Review De Novo 180, at 184-88; L. Blake and D.K. Stuart, 
"Analysis of a Recording Contract" in M. Halloran (ed.), The Musician "s Business a!ld Legal Guide 
(Upper Saddle River 2008), 282, 312-13. 
38 See e.g. FBT Productio!ls v Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir 2010); Tavares v Capitol 
Records, LLC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34317 (ND Cal. 2013); cf. Keifer v Harlequin Enters., 751 
F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2013) (book publisher evaded 50% license royalty by sublicensing to its own subsid-
iary for an artificially low price). There's been some litigation over this, with mixed results. One court 
concluded that the plain language of particular contracts obliges record labels to pay the larger licensing 
royalty for digital downloads. FBT Productions, 621 F.3d 958 (9th Cir 2010), 964-66. A different court 
held that the plain language of an essentially similar contract supports the argument that royalties for 
digital download licenses should be the same as royalties for the sale of hard copies. Malmsteen v 
Universal Music Group, 940 F. Supp. 2D 123, 132-33 (SDNY 2013). 
39 This assertion is controversial. Indeed, some scholars will find it offensive. Everyone who writes copy-
right scholarship views her work as pro-creator and pro-creativity, and believes that her proposals will 
improve the way the system works for the ultimate benefit of creators, however defined. I'm not sug-
gesting that scholars have not cared about creators, or have failed to produce proposals designed to 
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European scholars have recently paid somewhat more attention to this col-
lection of issues as part of a contentious effort to revise the European 
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market,40 and their reports 
have been dismaying. Real-world creators encounter significant obstacles 
to enjoying the rights and receiving the compensation that the law in theory 
affords them.41 Yet proposed solutions seem both modest and unlikely to 
effect significant improvement.42 Meanwhile, even those small con-ectives 
seem as if they would be unthinkable additions to cmTent American 
efforts at copyright refonn. 
If all of us can see these issues, at least in broad outline, and if at least 
some of us believe that these problems undennine the value and legitimacy 
of the copy1ight system, why have we not come up with better suggestions 
for addressing it? 
One possibility is that many of us have concluded that it's hopeless: the 
problem seems insoluble. Copyright intermediaries have too many oppor-
tunities to take advantage of creators and too few reasons to refrain from 
exploiting them. Over the past three hundred years, copyright laws have 
incorporated a variety of provisions intended to protect creators from over-
reaching inte1mediaiies; none of them has been paiiicularly effective. In the 
US, our copyright history is teeming with comi decisions that gutted statu-
tory safeguards for authors' rights. 
Although US copyright law has always required that transfers of copy-
right be made only by a signed wiiting,43 nineteenth-centlny publishers 
benefit them. I'm urging, rather, that our scholarship has paid too little attention the practical obstacles 
many creators face in taking advantage of the rights conferred by copyright law on copyright owners. 
Almost all of us (and I don't exclude myself) have failed to examine the ways that recent copyright 
practices and proposals give creators even less money and control than past practices and proposals. 
To the extent that we have an imperfect understanding of the mechanics of the copyright system in prac-
tice, our ideas for fixing it are likely to fall short. 
40 See European Commission, "Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market", 14 September 2016, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/transpar-
ency/regdoc/rep/l/2016/EN/1-2016-593-EN-Fl-l.PDF>. Most of the controversy centres on whether 
proposals to rebalance the law to provide more robust rights to publishers and impose more onerous 
obligations on platforms are good or bad policy. See e.g. P. Samuelson, "Legally Speaking: The 
EU's Controversial Digital Single Market Directive", 61 Communications of the ACM, fo1thcoming 
November 2018; "Google Criticized for Push Against EU Copyright Refom1", Financial Times, 26 
Jm1e 2018, available at <https://www.ft.com/content/a803 ld7a-78a0-1 le8-bc55-50dafl lb720d>; 
M. Banks, "MEPs Rally against Planned EU Copyright Reform", The Parliament, 8 June 2018, avail-
able at <https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/meps-rally-against-planned-eu-copyright-
reform>; K.G. Orphanides, "The EU's Bizarre War on Memes is Totally Unwinnable", Wired, 18 June 
2018, available at <http://www.wired.co.uk/article/eu-meme-war-article-13-regulation>. 
41 See e.g. L. Bently, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Problems Facing Freelance Creators in the 
UK Media Marketplace, A Briefing Document on Behalf of the Creators Rights Alliance", 29 June 
2009, available at <http://www.creatorsrights.org.uk/media/between.pdf>; Gibson, "The Business of 
Being an Author"; Kretschmer, "Does Copyright Law Matter?". 
42 Chapter 3 of the current draft EU directive would oblige member states to ensure that authors and per-
formers receive regular reports on the revenue generated by their works and the remuneration to which 
they are entitled, and to provide mechanisms for authors and performers to request additional remuner-
ation when the revenues earned from their works are grossly disproportionate to the revenues anticipated 
when a copyright assignment or licensing agreement was negotiated. See note 40 above. 
43 See e.g. Copyright Act of 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 124, 1st Cong. 2d Sess. (1790); Act. of February 3, 1831, § 
§ 6, 7, 2lstCong. 2d Sess. (1831); Rev. Stat.§§ 4964, 4965. 
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persuaded courts that that prerequisite did not limit their ability to secure 
ownership of the copyrights in works that had not yet been published 
and registered.44 The copyright renewal tenn was intended to enable 
an author who had assigned her copy1ight in the first tem1 to renegotiate 
the tenns of any licenses or assignments.45 In 1943, however, music 
publisher M. Witmark & Sons persuaded a divided Supreme Court 
that an assignment of the renewal term during the initial term was 
enforceable against the author.46 In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress 
replaced the renewal tenn with an inalienable right to terminate any 
assignment, grant, or license, and provided expressly that an author 
was entitled to terltlinate "notwithstanding any agreement to the con-
traiy" .47 The House Report explained that, in contrast to the ownership 
of the renewal term, "the right to take this action cannot be waived in 
advance or contracted away".48 Yet, assignees of copyright have devised 
strategies for undennining the supposed inalienable tennination right, 
and have largely succeeded in persuading courts of their effectiveness.49 
44 See e.g. Parton v Prang, 18 F. Cas. 1273, 1278 (C.C.D. Mass. 1872); Lawrence v Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26 
(C.C.D. Mass 1869); Pulte v Derby, 20 F. Cas. 51 (C.C. D. Ohio 1852). See generally J. Litman, "What 
Notice Did" (2016) 96 B.U.L.Rev. 717, at 724-31. 
45 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, 60th Cong. 14 (1909). See J.J. Guinan, Jr., "Duration of Copyright: Study No. 30" 
(1957), 77-79, reprinted in Copyright Society of the USA, Studies on Copyright, vol. 1 (1963), 495-97; 
B.A. Ringer, "Renewal of Copyright: Study No. 31" (1960), 121-22, reprinted in Copyright Society of 
the USA, Studies on Copyright, vol. 2 (1963), 503, 517-18. 
46 Fred Fisher Music Co. v M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643 (1943). The majority rejected the argument 
that the statute si10uld be construed to preserve the author's opportunity to renegotiate the teims of 
licenses or assignments: 
The policy of the copyright law, we are told, is to protect the author- ifneed be, from himself 
- and a constmction under which the author is powerless to assign his renewal interest 
furthers this policy. We are asked to recognize that authors are congenitally irresponsible, 
that frequently they are so sorely pressed for fonds that they are willing to sell their work 
for a mere pittance, and therefore assignments made by them should not be upheld .... 
It is not for courts to judge whether the interests of authors clearly lie upon one side of this 
question rather than the other. If an author cannot make an effective assignment of his 
renewal, it may be worthless to him when he is most in need. Nobody would pay an author 
for something he cannot sell. We cannot draw a principle of law from the familiar stories of 
garret-poverty of some men of literary genius. Even if we could do so, we cannot say that 
such men would regard with favour a mle of law preventing them from realizing on their 
assets when they are most in need of funds .... 
We conclude, therefore, that the Copyright Act of 1909 does not nullify agreements by 
authors to assign their renewal interests (ibid., at 656-57). 
47 17 USC§ 203(a)(5). See generally R.A. Reese, "Termination Fo.nnalities and Notice" (2016) 96 B.U.L. 
Rev. 895; Authors Alliance, "Tennination of Transfers" (2017), available at <https://www.authorsalli-
ance.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/201803 15-ToT-Templates. pd.f->. 
48 H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong. 125 (1976). 
49 E.g. Larson v Warner Brothers, 640 Fed. Appx. (9th Cir. 2016); Marvel Characters v Kirby, 726 F. 3d 
119 (2d Cir. 2013); DC Comics v Pacific Pictures Corp., 545 Fed, Appx. 678 (9th Cir. 2013); Penguin 
Group (USA) Inc. v Steinbeck, 537 F.3d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2383 (2009); 
Milne v Stephen Slesinger, Inc., 430 F.3d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 2005). See e.g. L.P. Loren, 
"Renegotiating the Copyright Deal in the Shadow of the Inalienable Right to Terminate" (20 I 0) 62 
Fla.L.Rev. 1329; P. Menell and D. Nimmer, "Judicial Resistance to Copyright's Inalienable Right to 
Tenninate Transfers" (2010) 33 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 227. 
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Thus, authors' ability to recapture copyright rights has, in practice, been 
narrowly limited. 50 
Also in the 1976 Act, Congress narrowed the circumstances under 
which an independent contractor's work could be deemed a work made 
for hire, legally authored by the creator's employer. Under the current 
copyright act, works created by employees are works made for hire. 
Works created by independent contractors, however, can be works 
made for hire only if the creator signs a work made for hire contract.51 
That hasn't prevented courts from concluding that works created by indi-
viduals who are not treated as employees for the purposes of labour and 
tax laws should nonetheless be deemed to be employee-created works 
made for hire, 52 or that works created by independent contractors who 
have not signed a work made for hire agreement should be considered 
to have been authored by the entity that paid for their creation, because 
that entity's decision-making authority made it the "dominant author" 
of the work. 53 
Even when the comts constme the statute in authors' favour, moreover, 
those interpretations have little practical effect on authors' opportunities to 
control or earn money from their works. In 1993, freelance journalists 
filed suit against the New York Times, claiming that the Times' licensing 
of their contributions to electronic and online databases infringed their 
reproduction, distribution and public display rights. Their initial permis-
sion to the Times to print their aiticles in its newspaper, they insisted, 
did not allow the Times to resell those articles to electronic database ser-
vices. The Times argued that a privilege in the statute pennitting the pub-
lisher of a collective work to reprint contributions to the collective work 
only as "part of the collective work, any revision of that collective 
work, or any later collective work in the same series'',54 authorised it to 
license full issues of its newspaper to digital publishers. The trial court 
50 Nor do copyright owners appear to be willing to allow the new or enhanced copyright rights they are 
seeking to be subject to comparable recapture provisions. Congress is currently considering the 
CLASSICS Act, a Bill that would establish an entitlement to royalties for the digital transmission of 
sound recordings that were recorded before US law extended copyright protection to sound recordings. 
See S. 2334, title 2, 115th Cong. (2018). Although the Bill is described by the recording industry asso-
ciation as a measure to "finally ensure that musicians and vocalists who made those timeless songs 
finally get their due", see Recording Industry Association of America, "Press Release: Historic 
Coalition of 213 Musical Artists Calls on Congress to Pass CLASSICS Act, FLx the 'Pre-1972' 
Loophole for Legacy Artists'', 13 Febmary 2018, available at <https://www.riaa.com/historic-
coalition-213-m1isical-artists-calls-congress-pass-classics-act-fix-pre-l972-loophole-legacy-artists/>, it 
includes no provisions that would allow the original authors of the sound recordings to recapture the 
ownership of rights they assigned to record labels. 
51 17 USC§§ 101, 201. See Commzmity for Creative Non Violence v Reid, 490 US 730 (1989). In addition 
to imposing the requirement of a signed writing, section I 01 limits the category of commissioned works 
made for hire to nine specific snbject matter categories. See United States Copyright Office, Circular 
No. 9: ~Works Made for Hire (2012), available at <https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf>. 
52 See e.g. Jus!Med v Byce, 600 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2010); JAH IP Holdings v Mascio, 2014 US Dist 
LEXIS 16246 (D. Colo. 2014). 
53 See 16 Casa Duse v Merkin, 791 F.3d 247, 260 (2d Cir. 2015). 
54 17 USC § 20l(c). 
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agreed. 55 In 2001, the US Supreme Court concluded that the purpose of 
the statutory privilege was to protect authors' abilities to license their 
works to other publishers, while enabling the publisher of the initial col-
lective work to print revised editions without again securing permission 
from eve1y contributor. That purpose would be frustrated if the publishers 
could license the individual contributions to electronic databases. 56 
In response to the Supreme Court's rnling, the New York Times 
announced that rather than compensating 27,000 freelance authors for the 
unauthorised licensing of their works to digital databases, it would instead 
permit individual authors to request that the Times continue to make all 
their works digitally available, without any additional payment, on the con-
dition that the authors release all legal claims against the Times and its data-
base licensees. Otherwise, the newspaper would purge all of those 
freelancers' contributions from its database.57 Further, in response to the 
lawsuit, the New York Times and other large publishers insisted, going for-
ward, that all freelance journalists sign work made for hire or all rights con-
tracts authmising publishers to exploit the works in future as well as 
existing media for no additional payment.58 As Maureen O'Rourke noted: 
"Although the holding in the case ostensibly gave freelancers a bargaining 
chip, a lack of bargaining power precludes their obtaining additional con-
sideration for licensing their judicially vindicated rights."59 
Nor have authors outside of the US fared significantly better. Recent 
sh1dies of the effectiveness of copyright law refmms in the EU designed 
to improve the lot of creators have concluded that the refonns enacted so 
far have been ineffective, p1imarily because authors lack the bargaining 
power to take advantage of them.6° 
55 Tasini v NY Times, 972 F. Supp. 804 (SONY 2007), rev'd 206 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2000), affd 533 U.S. 
483 (2001). 
56 NY Times v Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 499-506 (2001). 
57 See F. Barringer, "Freelancers Suing Again on Copyright", New York Times, 6 July 2001, available at 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/06/business/freelancers-suing-again-on-copyright.html>: 
The Times's cun-ent offer to freelancers - about 27,000 are affected, the newspaper estimates 
- allows them to request that their mrtterial remain available electronically. It contains a pro-
vision that "should you opt to have your work restored, you agree that you will not be com-
pensated and that you will release The Times from ariy claims relating to your work appearing 
in electronic archives such as Nexis." 
Any request must cover all of a freelancer's contributions to The Times; no freelancers can 
pick and. choose how much of their work can remain available. 
(ibid.). See "Tasini v The New York Times: A Note on the Consequences'', 2 Complete Review Quarterly 
#3, August 2001, available at <http://www.complete-review.com/quarterly/vol2/issue3/tasini.htm>. 
ss See O'Rourke, "Bargaining in the Shadow", pp. 605-13. 
59 Ibid., at p. 606. 
60 See e.g. J.C. Ginsburg and P. Sirinelli, "Private International Law Aspects of Authors' Contracts: The 
Dutch and French Examples" (2015) 39 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 171; S. Dusollier, C. Ker, 
M: Iglesias and Y. Smith, "Contractual Arrangements Applicable to Creators: Law and Practic·e of 
Selected Member States", study commissioned by the European Parliament Directorate-General for 
Internal Policies (2014), available at <http://www.cross-innovation.eu/wp-coutent/uploads/2014/03/ 
IPOL-ruRI_ET201449304l_EN.pdf>; Europe Economics lViR, "Remuneration of Authors of Books 
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Too often, copyiight scholars' work neglects questions of money. Even 
when we focus on authors' compensation, we don't always pay attention to 
whether the money achmlly makes its way into creators' pockets. Recently, 
we've been asking collecting societies to do the hard work of managing remu-
neration for many small-change uses.61 We've learned that collecting money 
is easy, but figuring out how to divide it among worthy claimants is really 
hard.62 The stah1tory, regulatory, and contrachml provisions that authorise col-
lective licensing call for the revenues to be distributed to creators and other 
rights holders, but the mechanisms that we use for deciding how to allocate 
and pay them are at best imperfect63 and often deeply fiawed.64 Collecting 
societies are themselves intennediaries who will seek to protect their own 
positions in the copy1ight food chain.65 We know that there are some collect-
ing entities that pay at least a share of their receipts directly to creators. There 
are others who pay owners, and rely on the owners to pass the creators' share 
on. Others dole out the money to organisations that represent creators and task 
those organisations with figuring out whether and how to distribute the funds 
to their members. Still others hold the money in an interest-bearing account 
until prospective claimants can agree with each other on who receives what 
share, and divide the money up according to their agreement. There are 
still others who don't disburse the royalties at all - they use the money to 
pay administrative costs and fund good works.66 
and Scientific Journals, Translators, Journalists and Visual Artists for the Use of Their Works", study 
prepared for the European C9mmission (2016), available at <https://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/download/ 
remuneration_of_authors_final_report.pdf>. 
61 See A. Katz, "Copyright Collectives: Good Solution but for Which Problem" in R.C. Dreyfuss, 
D. Zimmerman and H. First (eds.), Worldng Within the Boundaries of l11telleclua/ Property: 
Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society (New York 2010); see e.g. Music Modernization Act, 
H.R. 5447, I 15th Cong. § 102 (2018) (establishing a new music publisher-owned collective to receive 
and distribute royalties for a new statutory blanket license for the reproduction of musical compositions 
in the course of digital streaming). See generally D. Gervais (ed.), Collective Management of Copyright 
and Related Rights, 3rd ed. (Frederick 2016). 
62 See e.g. W. Fisher III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law & the Future of Entertain111e11t (Stanford, 
CA 2004), 207-36; D. Gervais, (Re)structuring Copyright: A Comprehensive Path to International 
Copyright Reform (Cheltenham 2017), 238-56; European Commission, "Directive on Collective 
Management of Copyright'', 4 Febmmy 2014, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/intemal_market/copy-
right/management/>; European Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment 
Accompanying the Document Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on collective management of copyright and related rights and multi-ten·itorial licensing of 
rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market 19-29, 11 July 2012, available at 
<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content!ENfTXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012SC0204&from=EN> (herein-
after "Commission Staff Working Document"). 
63 See e.g. Litman, "Real Copyright Refonn", p. 50 and n. 229. . 
64 See e.g. Copyright Royalty Board New Developments, 10 March 2017, available at <https://www.crb. 
gov/> (announcing suspension of royalty distribution proceedings required by 17 USC § 1007); 
Conm1ission Staff Working Document, pp. 15-29. 
65 See J. Band and B. Butler, "Some Cautionary Tales about Collective Licensing" (2013) 21 Michigan 
State International Law Review 687; see e.g. M. Long, "Publishers Raise New Concerns over SGAE 
Practices", IQ Magazine, 11 June 2018, available at <https://www.iq-mag.net/2018/06/publishers-
new-concerns-sgae-practices/#.Wx_5t1Mvw74>. 
66 See e.g. H. Wijminga, W. Klomp, M. van der Jagt and J. Poort, "World Intellectual Property 
Association International Survey on Private Copying: Law and Practice 2016" (2017), available at 
<http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_l 037_2017 .pdf>. 
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Most legal scholars don't spend much attention examining this problem, 
or trying to ascertain what mechanisms different collecting entities use for 
deciding how to disburse the money they collect. It's as if, once we've pro-
vided that consumers and users must buy a ticket in order to enjoy a copy-
righted work, we're done. There may be some policy justification for 
charging fees as a purely expressive exercise, so that users will understand 
that enjoyment of a copyrighted work has commercial value. It's wasteful, 
in the sense that some members of an author's audience will miss encoun-
tering the work because they can't afford or don't want to pay the ticket 
price, but we may make that choice nonetheless to send the message that 
enjoying works of authorship should not be free. 67 If that's why we're 
doing it, though, we should say so. If, on the other hand, our purported rea-
son for levying the charge is to put money into creators' pockets, it might 
be a good idea to look to see how much of it actually gets there. At least in 
the US, that question hasn't been the focus of much legal scholarship.68 
Some copyright scholars have begun to ask the question whether and 
when creators respond to the rewards promised by copyright, and to try 
to harness the insights of disciplines other than the law- economics, psych-
ology, neurology, history - to see whether it might be 'possible to come up 
with answers.69 It's difficult, though, to evaluate whether the answers to 
that question have real-world significance without knowing whether and 
under what circumstances creators will actually collect those rewards. 
If I'm right that most of us have given up on close scrntiny of author 
compensation because we suspect that it's a hopeless inquiry, this may 
be a good time to re-examine that impulse. That, however, would require 
us to confront the questions we no longer ask and the features of the copy-
right system that we seldom notice, because we've grown inured to the 
67 Cf J.C. Ginsburg, "Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?" (2015) 29 Berkeley Tech.L.J. 1383. 
68 But see P. DiCola, "Money From Music: Survey Evidence on Musicians' Revenue and Lessons About 
Copyright Incentives" (2013) 55 ACJ 301. There are a number of recent economic and legal studies 
from Europe, with discouraging conclusions. See e.g. M. Kretschmer, "Copyright and Contracts: 
Regulating Creator Contracts: The State of the Art and a Research Agenda" (2010) 18 J.Intell.Prop. 
L. 141; R. Towse, "Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies and Digital Rights: Is there a Case 
for a Centralised Digital Copyright Exchange?" (2012) 9 Review of Economic Research on 
Copyright Issues 3; C. Handke and R. Towse, "Economics of Copyright Collecting Societies" 
(2007) 38 International Review of Intellectual Property & Competition Law 937; R. Towse, 
"Copyright and Artists: A View From Cultural Economics" (2006) 20 Journal Economic Surveys 
567; Europe Economics IViR, "Remuneration of Authors"; M. Kretschmer, "Private Copying and 
Fair Compensation: An Empirical Study of Copyright Levies in Europe" (2011 ), available at 
<https://asset5.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/fi!e/ 
310183/ipresearch-faircomp-2011 IO.pdf>. 
69 E.g. G. Ll!Ilney, Copyright's Excess: Money and Music in the US Recording Induslly (Cambridge 
2018); C. Sprigman, "Copyright and Creative Incentives: What We Know (and Don't)" (2017) 55 
Hous.L.R. 451; R. Tusbnet, "Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions" (2009) 
51 William & Mary Law Review 513; D. Zimmeiman, "Copyright As Incentives: Did We Just 
Imagine That?" (2010) 12 Theo Inq Law 29; M. Senftleben, "Copyright, Creators, & Society's Need 
for Autonomous Art - the Blessing and Curse of Monetary Incentives" (2017) in Giblin and 
Weatherall, What If We Could Reimagine Copyright?, p. 25. See also CREA Te Copyright Research 
Centre at the University of Glasgow, Copyright Evidence Wiki, available at <http://www.copyrightevi-
dence.org/evidence-wiki/index.php/Copyright_Evidence> (cataloguing empirical studies). 
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ways that the copyright system fails to deliver on the promises of copyright 
theory. 
III. COPYRIGHT AND PROPERTY 
In the rest of this essay, I'll argue that one reason we talk less than we 
should about how the copyiight system cmmnonly fails to reward creators 
is that our assumptions about legal property rights distort our perceptions of 
the way the copy1ight laws operate. Copy1ight experts take a lot for granted 
about the way the copyright system works and is supposed to work. 
Copyright is a property right. We're lawyers. The legal characteristics of 
property rights are basic building blocks of our legal education. 
One element of legal property rights is control, and most of the debates 
over treating copy1ight as a fonn of property have focused on the control 
that a property owner is able or should be able to exercise.7° Control is 
an important aspect of property, but it isn't the only or even the most 
impmtant aspect. After all, we have lots of different ways to give an indi-
vidual legal control over something without giving her a prope1ty right. 
What makes prope1ty iights special is that they are alienable. 71 Treating 
something as prope1ty makes it easier to sell. We define a right as a prop-
erty right to encourage its transfer. 72 This intrinsic feature of legal property 
is something that it's easy for lawyers to take for granted. What makes it 
possible for publishers, record labels, and other intennediaries to behave 
the way they've been behaving is that the powers confe1Ted by a copyright 
belong to the copyi·ight owner rather than the author. 73 That strikes non-
lawyers as odd, but it's second nature to us. Our copy1ight system empow-
ers publishers and record labels to struchire licensing deals for their own 
benefit, since they own the copyrights, and set the tenns and conditions 
for copyright licenses. 
Because we're lawyers, we know that the grantee of a property right 
stands in the shoes of the grantor and is entitled to exercise the powers 
embodied in the prope1ty iight. We assume that the original prope1ty 
owner has had the opportunity to extract compensation for the value of 
the right, because that's just how prope1ty rights work. Indeed, copy1ight 
lawyers and scholars sometimes use the words "author" and "copyright 
70 See e.g. L. Lessig, Free Culture (New York 2004), 83-173; Patry, Moral Pa11ics a11d the Copyright 
Wars, pp. 109-32; S. Aistars, D. Hartline and M. Schultz, "Copyright Principles and Priorities to 
Foster a Creative Digital Marketplace" (2016) 23 Geo. Mason L.Rev. 769; M. Grynberg, "Property 
Is a Two-Way Street: Personal Copylight Use and Implied Autholization" (2010) 79 Fordham L. 
Rev. 435; R.P. Merges, "The Concept of Property in the Digital Era" (2008) 45 Hous.L.R. 1239; 
A. Mossoff, "Is Copyright Property?" (2005) 42 San Diego L.Rev. 29. 
71 Accord, Ginsburg, "The Place of the Author in Copyright'', pp. 66-67. 
72 See e.g. J. Linnan, "Information Plivacy/Information Property" (2000) 52 Stan.L.Rev. 1283, at 1295-
301. 
73 See e.g. Fisher, Promises to Keep, pp. 47-70, 204-05; Bently, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place", 
pp. 15-21; Kretschmer, "Does Copyright Law Matter?'', pp. 32-33. 
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owner" interchangeably, treating them as synonyms.74 After all, the author 
is the initial copyiight owner, and the person to whom she transfers those 
rights is entitled to step into her shoes. For most purposes, in the eyes of the 
law, the owner is the author.75 
We could take a mcire nuanced look at how legal copyright property 
rights actually behave in the world. We should examine our view of 
legal property to identify the things that our assumptions may prevent us 
from seeing. 
IV. THE DAWES ACT AND THE STATUTE OF ANNE 
I'm going to take a short detour to tell a story that, at least at first, isn't 
going to seem as if it has any bearing .on copY).ight law. It begins about 
400 years ago. In the sixteenth aI1d seventeenth cenhiries, European colo-
nists sailed to North Ame1ica to deveiop new tenitmies in the names of 
their sovereigns.76 · · 
Unfortunately, the new land ah-eady had occupants who had lived on that 
land for cenhmes. The European settlers moved in anyway. Sometimes, it 
was possible for the Europeans and the indigenous tribes to coexist, at least 
initially; in other situations, thm1gh, the indigenous Indian tiibes occupied 
area that the Europeans wanted to control.77 The Indians weren't white, 
weren't Christian and were1ft fanners. They weren't using the land for 
what the Europeans believed to be the best and highest purpose. 78 Some 
of the European settlements felt litt.le compunction about seizing the land 
from its occupants. Violence ensued.79 
Eventually, after enough people had been killed and enough property had 
been damaged, the settlements and the tribes reached agreements, dividing 
74 See e.g. J.C. Ginsburg, "Copyright Use and Excuse on the Internet" (2000) 24 Colum.-VLA J .L. & Arts 
I, at 41; R. Oman, "Going Back to First Principles: The Exclusive Rights of Authors Rehorn" (2008) 8 
Journal of High Technology Law 169, at 176-77, 180. 
75 See e.g. B. Viswanathan and A. Mossoff, "Open-Access Mandates and the Seductively False Promise of 
'Free'", Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property Briefing Paper 4, April 2017, available at 
<http://apo.org.au/node/93506>. Moral rights, of course, are an important exception to this rnle. 
Even in countries with robust moral rights protection, however, those rights appear to have negligible 
economic value and restrain the exploitation of copyrighted works only in extreme cases. 
76 See generally R.T. Anderson, B. Berger, S. Krakoffand P.E. Frickey, American Indian Law: Cases and 
Commentmy, 3rd ed. (St. Paul 2015), 22-25. 
77 See generally e.g. N.J. Newton (ed.), Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law: 200j Edition (Newark 
2005). 
7s See ibid.; E. Kades, "The Dark Side of Efficiency: Johnson v M'Intos/z and the Expropriation of 
American Indian Lands" (2000) 148 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1065, at 1076-77. 
79 See B. Berger, "Red: Racism and the American Indian" (2009) 56 UCLA Law Review 591, at 603-07. 
See e.g. E.A. Schmidt, The Divided Dominion: Social C01iflict and Indian Hab·ed in Early Virginia 
Boulder, CO (2014), 45-61 (Anglo-Powhatan wars between English settlers in the Virgini\l Colony 
and the Powhatan tribe); S. Feeley, "'Before Long to be Good Friends:' Diplomatic Perspectives of 
the Tuscarora War" in M. LeMastet and B.J. Wood (eds.), Creating and Contesting Carolina 
(Columbia 2013), 140 (Tuscarora war between Tuscarora tribe and British, German and Dutch settlers 
in North Carolina); E. Haefeli, "Kieft's War and the Cultures of Violence in Colonial America" in M.A. 
Bellesi!es (ed.), Lethal Imagination: Violence and Brutality in American Hist01y (New York I 999), 17 
(war between Dutch settlers in the New Netherland colony and the Lenape tribe). 
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up the disputed territory between them. 80 Those agreements, though, turned 
out to be unstable. The European-Americans kept seeking to expand their 
territory. Over the next 200 or so years, they used money, persuasion, 
threats, citizen violence, and military force to convince or compel Indian 
tribes to relocate westward to more remote and less desirable land. 81 
Along the way, more violence ensued. 82 The American army was busy con-
ducting one or another war with Indian tribes for most of the nineteenth 
century.83 
American courts concluded that Indians had an enforceable legal right to 
occupy tiibal land, but that they didn't actually own it.84 The US federal 
Government came under immense pressure to open Indian land for settle-
ment by white European-Americans.85 It tried to use the tools at its disposal 
(money and soldiers) to move the tlibes out of the way of white homestea-
ders. Indian tribes who had agreed to resettle west of the Mississippi river, 
only to be asked to move again, were increasingly reluctant to consent to be 
uprooted. 86 Besides, the Government was nmning out of surplus land. 87 
Yet more violence followed. 88 
White Americans resented the tiibes' conti·ol of land that they believed 
should by rights be available to them. They pursued a variety of devices, 
many of them unlawfol, to wrest control of the land from the tiibes. 89 
What ended up doing the trick was a seiies of statutes of which the most 
famous was the Dawes Act, also known as the General Allotment Act of 
1887.90 Instead of taking the land away from the tribes, the Dawes Act 
gave title to the tribal land to individual Indians. The Act divided the 
vast tracts of territory controlled by Indian tribes into many 160-acre 
plots, and awarded each plot to an individual Indian head of household, 
80 See S. Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land (Cambridge, MA 2005), 85-111. 
81 See e.g. Anderson et al., American Indian LaH-', p. 50; Banner, Hmv the Indians Lost their Land, 
pp. 191-227. 
82 See e.g. Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, pp. 121-29; Newton, Cohen's Handbook, pp. 35-
36, 39-40, 44; A. Deboe, A Histo1y of the Indians of the United States (Norman, OK 1970), 101-16; 
A. Deboe, The Road to Disappeara1ice: A His/OJ)' of the Creek Indians (Norman, OK 1966), 72-107. 
83 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, pp. 237-47; see e.g. Newton, Cohen's Handbook, 
pp. 51-54, 71; E.A. Schwartz, The Rogue River Indian War and Its Afiennath: 1859-1980 (Norman, 
OK 1997), 69-160. 
8~ E.g. Johnson's Lessee v JJ;J'Intosh, 21 US 543 (1923); see Banner, How the Indians Lost 77ieir Land, pp. 150-
90; L.G. Robinson, "The Judicial Conquest of Native America: The Story of Johnson v M'Intoslz" in 
C. Goldberg, K.K. Washburn and P.P. Frickey (eds.), Indian Law Stories (New York 2011 ), 29. 
85 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, pp. 195-226. 
86 See ibid., at pp. ·197-201, 212-17, 222-26; Newton, Cohen's Handbook, pp. 51-54, 73. 
87 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, pp. 228-36. 
88 See e.g. Anderson et al., American Indian Law, pp. 74-77; Newton, Cohen's Handbook, pp. 70-71, 73. 
89 See Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, pp. 214-27, 237-45. 
90 General Allohnent Act of 8 February 1887, 24 Stat. 388, ch. 119. See also Act for the Protection of the 
People oflndian Territory, Pub. L. 55-515, 30 Stat. 495 (1898) ("Curtis Act"); Dawes Act Amendment 
of 1891, 26 Stat. 794 (1891); General Allotment Act Amendment of1906, Pub. L. 59-149, 34 Stat. 182 
(1906) ("Burke Act"); Act Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to allot homesteads to the natives of 
Alaska, Pub. L. 59-171, 34 Stat. 197 (1906). For historical background on the allotment policy and a 
brief description of initial allotment efforts preceding the Dawes Act, see generally Newton, Cohen's 
Handbook, pp. 66-69, 75-78. 
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in tmst for a short period and then in fee simple. During the tmst pe1iod, the 
Indian owners were pennitted to lease the plot to white Americans. After 
the tmst period expired, the Indian household that owned the land was 
free to sell it to any buyer. Any unallocated plots were deemed "surplus 
land", and were purchased from the tribe by the federal Government and 
made available for sale to non-Indians. At the time, I'm sure that some 
of the supporters of the law believed it would empower individual 
Indians to vest them with ownership of a plot of land; other supporters, 
though, had more cynical motives. In any event, to the extent that one pur-
pose of the statutes was to encourage the transfer of land from Indian tiibes 
to white American citizens, it was a sh1mling success. Very quickly, the 
majority of the land occupied by Indian tiibes passed out of Indian hands 
through sales to non-Indians. The winners were white settlers and land 
speculators; the Indians ended up both impoverished and often displaced.91 
I want to draw a couple of parallels from that stmy to a stahlte that copy-
right lawyers are more familiar with. This story starts at about the same 
time. In the sixteenth and seventeenth cenhrries, the members of the 
Stationers' Company had a monopoly on publishing, augmented by a 
naked horizontal restraint of trade among the members.92 After more 
than a century controlling the business of publishing, the Stationers surely 
felt entitled to continue to exercise that control. They had, after all, invested 
significant money and efforts into printing and selling their texts. When 
Parliament declined to re-enact the licensing act that gave the members 
of the Stationers company their printing monopoly, the Stationers engaged 
in strenuous lobbying to persuade the Government to restore it.93 
I don't want to simplify the complex set of considerations that went into 
enacting the Stahlte of Anne,94 or to minimise the provisions included for 
the protection of universities, readers and consumers, 95 or to suggest that 
9 t Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land, pp. 257-93; see J.V. Royster, "The Legacy of Allotment" 
(1995) 27 Ariz.St.L.J. I, at IQ-14. In 1934, Congress repudiated the allotment program. The Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 prohibited forther allotment of Indian land and sought to return to the tribes 
some portion of the 90 million acres oflndian land that had passed into non-Indian ownership. Indian 
Reorganization Act, Pub. L. "No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-
479 (1976). See Blad.feet Tribe oflndians v State of Montana, 729 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1984) (en bane), 
aff'd 471 US 759 (1985). 
92 See e.g. L.R. Patterson, Copyrig/it in Historical Perspective (Nashville 1968), 28-77; I. Gadd, "The 
Stationers Company in England before 1710" in I. Alexander and H.T. Gomez-Arostegui (eds.), 
Research Handbook on the History of Copyright Law (Cheltenham 2018), 81, 88-92. 
93 See C. ·Blagden, The Stationers Company: A Hist01y 1403-1959 (London 1960), 153-77; R. Deazley, 
On the Origin of the Right to Copy (Oxford 2004), 1-50; I. Alexander, "All Change for the Digital 
Economy: Copyright and Business Models in the Early Eighteenth Century" (2010) 25 Berkeley 
Tech.L.J. 1351; Gadd, "The Stationers Company in England before 1710", pp. 92-95. 
94 Statute of Anne, 8. Anne, c. 19 (1710). See e.g. Deazley, On the Origin of the Right to Copy, pp. 31-50; 
Alexander, "All Change for the Digital Economy", pp. 1354-62; H.T. Gomez-Arostegui, "The Untold 
Story of the First Copyright Suit under the Statute of Anne in 1710" (20 l O) 25 Berkeley Tech.L.J. 1247, 
at 1251-58; J. Litman, "Readers' Copy1ight" (2011) 58 J. Copyright Soc'y U.S.A. 325, at 332-35. 
95 See A. Katz, "Copy1ight, Exhaustion, and the Role of Libraries in the Ecosystem ofKnowledge" (2016) 
131/S Journal of Law & Policy for the Information Society 81, at 84-86; Litman, "Readers' Copyright", 
pp. 333-35. 
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some of the law's supporters didn't believe that it would empower authors. 
Whatever the intention, the law ended up working out pretty well for the 
members of the Stationers' company. By establishing an assignable prop-
erty right for authors and their assigns, the law encouraged authors to con-
vey their copyrights to printers and publishers (who, after all, were the folks 
with the printing presses), where they have stayed pretty much for the next 
300 years.96 
The rest of the world followed that model.97 In almost every country, 
authors receive copy1ight protection as an initial matter, but those copy-
rights are transferred to and then owned and controlled by publishers and 
other intennedimies.98 In the US, where capitalism is both our economic 
system and our dominant religion, courts were especially eager to conclude 
that authors had conveyed their copyiights to publishers, even in the 
absence of any evidence, and that inclination has persisted. 99 When it 
didn't work to simply presume that the copyright had been transfeffed, 
our courts invented the work made for hire doctrine out of whole cloth. 100 
The moral ofboth of these stories is that deeming a resource to be a prop-
erty right is often an extremely effective way to gain control of that 
resource, especially when you don't have control of it at the outset. 
When the law transfonns something that was not fom1erly property into 
a property right, the accompanying alienability will cause control of it to 
flow to those with. the most bargaining power. If you are looking to get 
your hands on some arable land or to regain your control of the printing 
of texts, creating new property rights turns out to be an excellent strategy. 
Sometimes the original recipient of the property benefits, but not always. 
Sometimes the world improves as a result; other times it doesn't. 
V. THE WAGES OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
So, here's the upshot: immense sums of money slosh through the cuffent 
copyright system, but only a tiny share of that money ends up in authors' 
pockets. By some accounts, that share has been decreasing. We all know 
that, because, as I said, we live in the world and see the evidence all around 
us, but we have tended to overlook it when we tallc about copyright law 
refonn. Over the past 300 years, we've expanded and extended copyiight 
96 See Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective, pp. 143-50, 213-21. · 
97 See e.g. 0. Bracha, "The Adventures of the Statute of Anne in the Land of Unlimited Possibilities: The 
Life of a Legal Transplant" (2010) 25 Berkeley Tech.L.J. 1427. 
98 See J.C. Ginsburg and E. Treppoz, International Copyright Law US and EU Perspectives: Text and 
Cases (Cheltenham 2015); P. Goldstein and B. Hugenholz, International Copyright, 2nd ed. (Oxford 
2010), 244--69; Ginsburg, "The Place of the Author in Copyright", pp. 63-66. 
99 See Litman, "What Notice Did", pp. 732-34; see e.g. Bleistein v Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U. 
S. 239, 248-49 (1903); Edward Thompson Co. Am. Law Book Co., 119 F. 217, 219 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1902); Collie1y Eng'r Co. v United Correspondence Schs., 94 F. 152, 153 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1899). 
100 See C. Fisk, "Authors at Work: The Origins of the Work-for-Hire Doctrine" (2003) 15 Yale J.L. & 
Human.!. 
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repeatedly, and larded the law up with new licenses and payment obliga-
tions.101 We've failed, however, to pay enough attention to how - or 
whether - the intennediaiies tasked with distributing the revenues actually 
disburse them. We don't look inside the black box surrounding the author's 
conveyance of her rights to a new owner. Because we understand how 
property rights work, we trust and assume that the profits flowing from 
copyright expansion redound to the benefit of authors. 
But, because we live in the world, we know, or should know, that often 
they don't. Ifwe believe that that's a problem (and I happen to), we won't 
be able to figure out how to fix it without a careful examination of what is 
inside the black box. That means asking some questions that we aren't in 
the habit of asking, and that copyright owners are not in the habit of 
answering. 102 
(Let me say, parenthetically, that if we decide that it isn't a problem that 
authors receive so small a share of the proceeds from their works, the fuss 
about the so called "value gap" makes even less sense. If we believe that 
economics and policy support the conclusion that authors' teeny-weeny 
percentage of the vast sums generated by the enjoyment of works of enter-
tainment and infmrnation is the right amount to pay them, it's hard to see 
any justification for interfe1ing in the negotiations among conm1ercial dis-
tributors to dictate which of them gets the largest share of the very substan-
tial remainder.) 
If the problem is worth addressing, though, we should have learned by 
now that it isn't a useful solution to throw more money and control at copy-
right owners and trust that, this time, they will share a larger part of it with 
authors. 
I want to emphasise the nmTow limits of the argument that I'm making. 
I'm not arguing that the alienability of copyrights is itself the problem, nor 
that I believe that we could solve it simply by limiting copyright transfers or 
making rights inalienable. After all, consider Ge1rnany. Gennany treats 
copyrights as inalienable, at least formally, 103 but Gennan authors don't 
appear to enjoy significant financial advantages over authors from other 
countiies. 104 I think the role that the alienability of property rights plays 
in my argument is twofold. First, whenever we have significant disparities 
101 See e.g. N.W. Netanel, Copyright's Paradox (Oxford 2008), 54-80. 
102 I don't ri1ean to minimise the practical difficulties posed by intermediaries' insistence that contract terms 
and payments are proprietary information that they are entitled to keep secret. See e.g. P. DiCola and 
D. 'rouve, "Licensing in the Shadow of Copyright" (2014) 17 Stanford Technology Law Review 397, at 
443-57. 
103 See German Copyright Act§§ 29, 31. 
104 See e.g. M. Kretschmer and P. Hardwick, "Authors' Earnings from Copyright and Non-Copyright 
Sources: A Survey of 25,000 B1itish and Gennan Wliters" (Dprset 2007), available at https://rnicro-
sites.bournemouth; Kretschmer, "Does Copyright Law Matter?", pp. 12-i5; Senftleben, "Copyright, 
Creators, & Society's Need for Autonomous Art", p. 53. See also e.g. Ginsburg and Silinelli, 
"Private International Law Aspects of Authors' Contracts" (examining private international law obsta-
cles to implementing author-protective legislation enacted in France and the Netherlands). 
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in wealth and bargaining power, the distribution of freely alienable property 
rights is almost always going to min-or and will often exacerbate those dis-
parities. Second, the legal dogma s1mounding property rights, which, as 
lawyers, we've inhaled since we were students, can keep us from appreci-
ating those dispaiities. We don't pay enough attention to the use of alien-
able property rights as a device to allow powerful actors to appropriate 
valuable items in the control of less powerful actors. 
VI. SEEING WHAT WE DON'T SEE 
Is the problem indeed as intractable at it sometimes seems, or is there some-
thing we could do to address it? 
Copyright in the twenty-first centmy is a byzantine legal ecosystem. I 
believe that there would be real value in our explming that ecosystem, care-
fully and from the inside, in order to understand the reasons that it has per-
sistently given creators short sl11ift. That would involve our taking a 
painstaking look at the way that authors and copyright owners stmcture 
their interactions, to figure out where, if anywhere, an intervention might 
be effective. 
I don't have an easy solution to propose. It's possible, but unlikely, that 
we could tweak copyiight ownership law or revise copyright licensing ml es 
in ways that could significantly improve the world for at least some 
authors. 105 Throwing more copyright 1ights at copyright owners106 is 
unlikely to trickle down to creators - at least unless and until we understand 
more of the dynamic that results in their getting such a small share of the 
proceeds from their creations. Adjusting the law to enhance the bargaining 
power of publishers over platfonns or platforms over publishers 107 isn't 
105 See e.g. J.E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Se/f(flew Haven 2012), 223-{)6; Gervais, Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights, pp. 191-215; W. Patry, How to Fix Copyright (Oxford 
2011), 177-88; J. Silbey, The Eureka Myth: Creators, Innovators and Eve1yday Intellectual Property (Stanford 2015), 274-85; Loren, "Renegotiating the Copyright Deal"; R.A. Reese, "Optional Copyright 
Renewal: Lessons for Designing Copyright Systems, The 38 Annual Horace J. Manges Lecture" (2015) 
39 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 145; M. Van Houweling, "Making Copyright Work for Authors 
Who Write to Be Read" (2015) 38 Columbia Journal of Law & the Ails 381. 
106 See e.g. H.R. 1836, Fair Play Fair Pay Act, I 15th Cong. (2017) (giving sound recording copyright own-
ers new exclusive right to perform their smmd recordings over AM and FM radio); C. Geiger, 
0. Bulayenko and G. Frosio, "The Introduction of a Neighbouring Right for Press Publishers at EU 
Level: The Unneeded (and Unwanted) Refonn" (2017) 39 EIPR 202. 
107 See e.g. Joint Comments of Amer. Ass'n of Independent Music et. aL, U.S. Copyright Office: In re 
Section 512 Study, Docket No. 2015-7, 31 March 2016, available at <https://www.riaa.com/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2016/03/Music-Community-Submission-in-re-DMCA-5 l 2-FINAL-7 559445 .pdf>; J. Chu 
and T. Marino, "Victims of IP Theft Need Better Protection", The Hill, 12 March 2014, available at 
<http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/200630-victims-of-ip-theft-need-better-protection>; J. Taplin, "Is it 
Time to Break Up Google?", New York Times, 22 April 2017, available at <https://www.nytimes. 
com/2017/04/22/opinion/sunday/is-it-time-to-break-up-google.html>; S. Carlisle, "DMCA 
'Takedown' Notices: Why 'Takedown' Should Become 'Takedown and Stay Down' and Why It's 
Good for Everyone", Nova Southeastern University Copyright Office Blog, 23 July 2014, available 
at <http://copyiight.nova.edu/dmca-takedown-notices/>; E. Hmmon, "'Notice and Stay Down' Is 
Really Filter Everything", Electronic Frontier Foundation Deeplinks Blog, 21 January 2016, available 
at <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/01/notice-and-stay-down-really-filter-everything>. 
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calculated to make life better for creators. I don't see much promise in any 
of the pending statutory or treaty proposals currently on the table. It may be 
that those proposals are the only proposals that have any practical chance of 
adoption, precisely because Reed Elsevier, Vivendi, Disney or Google 
won't countenance any new law or treaty that leaves them no better off 
than the current law. Copyright inte1mediaiies have enough political 
power to insist on watering down refonn proposals until they will be of lit-
tle actual use to creators, and have recently exercised that power to revise 
legislative and treaty proposals in their favour. 108 Over the past 20 years, 
we've seen several unsuccessful efforts to refonn national and international 
copy1ight law-making processes to weaken the influence wielded by power-
ful copyright players. 109 Such efforts face obstacles that seem insu1111ount-
able. The firm hold that copyright inte1mediaries have on national and 
international law-making processes, and their current preoccupation with 
marshalling all available resources to vanquish each other, suggest that real-
istic opportunities for author-empowering copyright reforms may be scant. 
I suspect that we may end up concluding that the more promising propo-
sals are only tangentially related to copyright law. Many creators lack the 
bargaining power to exercise the rights theoretically afforded to them by 
current law. 110 If the pivotal problem is a lack of bargaining power, though, 
new or enhanced property rights are unlikely to solve it. It is just remotely 
possible that we might make more headway by attacking the problem from 
the other end. There may be interventions to address the bargaining power 
deficit more directly. Catherine Fisk has argued that encouraging authors to 
engage in collective bargaining may be the most practical solution, even if 
the price of that bargaining would be the loss of copyright ownership. 111 I 
can imagine requiring the collecting entities that don't currently pay the 
creators' share of royalties directly to creators to do so from now on. 112 
Some scholars have suggested that self-publishing over the Internet may 
allow creators to compete directly with intennediaiies and to collect a larger 
share of the proceeds from their works. 113 My colleague Jeremy Peters has 
108 See e.g. R. Giblin, "Should It Be Copyright's Role to Fill Houses with Books?" in S. Frankel and 
D. Gervais (eds.), Intellectual Property and Regulation of the Internet: The Nexus ·with Human and 
Economic Development (Wellington 2017); M.E. Kaminski, "The Capture of International 
Intellectual Property Through the US Trade Regime" (2014) 87 S.Cal.L.Rev. 977. 
109 See e.g. G. Krikorian and A. Kapczynski (eds.), Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual 
Property (New York 2010); L. Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress - and a Plan 
to Stop It (New York 2011). 
110 See e.g. Bently, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place"; Ginsburg and Sirinelli, "Private International Law 
Aspects of Authors' Contracts"; O'Rourke, "Bargaining in the Shadow". 
111 See C. Fisk, "Hollywood Writers and the Gig Economy" (2018) 2017 U.Chi. Legal F. 177. 
112 See e.g. Future of Music Coalition, "Principles for Artist Compensation in New Business Models", 2 
April 2009, available at <https://www.futureofmusic.org/article/article/pdnciples-artist-compensation-
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